Abstract-In this paper, we develop a formalism for distilling a classical key from a quantum state in a systematic way, expanding on our previous work on a secure key from bound entanglement (Horodecki et al., 2005) . More detailed proofs, discussion, and examples are provided of the main results. Namely, we demonstrate that all quantum cryptographic protocols can be recast in a way which looks like entanglement theory, with the only change being that instead of distilling Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) pairs, the parties distill private states. The form of these general private states are given, and we show that there are a number of useful ways of expressing them. Some of the private states can be approximated by certain states, which are bound entangled. Thus, distillable entanglement is not a requirement for a private key. We find that such bound entangled states are useful for a cryptographic primitive we call a controlled private quantum channel (PQC). We also find a general class of states, which have negative partial transpose (are NPT), but which appear to be bound entangled. The relative entropy distance is shown to be an upper bound on the rate of a key. This allows us to compute the exact value of a distillable key for a certain class of private states.
I. INTRODUCTION

W
E often want to communicate with friends or strangers in private. Classically, this is impossible if we wish to communicate over long distances, unless we have met before with our friend and exchanged a secret key which is as long as the message we want to send. On the other hand, quantum cryptography allows two people to communicate privately with only a very short key, which is just used to authenticate the message.
Every quantum cryptographic protocol is equivalent to the situation where both parties (Alice and Bob) share some quantum state , and then perform local operations on that state and engage in public communication (LOPC) to obtain a key that is private from any eavesdropper. Until recently, every quantum protocol was also equivalent to distilling pure entanglement from this shared state. For example, achieving privacy was equivalent to the two parties converting many copies of the state , to a smaller number of pure EPR pairs [23] (1) using local operations and classical communication (LOCC), and then performing a measurement on the EPR pairs in the computational basis. Examples of such protocols include BB84 [7] , [50] , B92 [5] , [52] , and, of course, E91 [24] . It was thus thought that achieving security is equivalent to distilling pure entanglement, and a number of results pointed in this direction [1] , [11] , [18] , [19] , [28] , [29] , [49] .
Recently, however, we have shown that this is not the case-there exist examples of bound entangled states that can be used to obtain a secret key [35] . Bound entangled states [37] are ones that need pure entanglement to create, but no pure entanglement can be distilled from them. This helps explain the properties of bound entangled states. They have entanglement that protects correlations from the environment (or an eavesdropper), but the entanglement is so twisted that it cannot be brought into pure form. This then raised the question of what types of quantum states provide privacy. In [35] , we were able to find the general form of private quantum states . This allowed us to recast the theory of privacy (under local operations and public communication-or LOPC) in terms of entanglement theory (local operations and classical communication-or LOCC). In entanglement theory, the basic unit is the EPR pair, while in privacy theory, the only difference is that one replaces the EPR pair with general private states as the basic units. In this paper, we review the results of [35] in greater detail, and expand on the proofs and tools. Namely, we study and show that the general form of a private state on a Hilbert space with dimensions , , and is of the form (2) where is a projector onto the maximally entangled state , and is the arbitrary twisting operation
The key is obtained after measuring in the basis. We will henceforth refer to as the maximally entangled or EPR state (or Bell state in dimension ). We show that the rate of a key 0018-9448/$25.00 © 2009 IEEE that can be obtained from a quantum state can be strictly greater than the distillable entanglement, and this even holds if the distillable entanglement is strictly zero. We also show [35] that the size of the private key is generally bounded from above by the regularized relative entropy of entanglement [55] . This will be sufficient to prove that one can have a maximal rate of a key strictly less than the entanglement cost (the number of singlets required to prepare a state under LOCC).
In Section II, we introduce some of the basic concepts and terminology we will use throughout this paper. This includes the notion of private states, pbits, which contain one bit of a private key, and pdits, which have many bits of a key. In Section III, we show that a state is secure if and only if it is of the form given above. Then we show different useful ways to write the private states in Section IV, and give some useful examples, and examine some of their properties. This includes the notion of irreducibility that is used to define the basic unit of privacy for private states.
States that have a perfect bit of a key must have some distillable entanglement [40] . The case of bound entangled states with a secure key is only found in the case of states which are not perfectly secure, although they are arbitrarily secure. This motives our investigation in Section V of approximate pbits. We then demonstrate how to rewrite a bipartite state in terms of the eavesdropper's density matrix in Section VI. This allows us to interpret previous results in terms of the eavesdropper's states. Then, in Section VII, we summarize the previous results in preparation for showing that bound entangled states can have a key. In Sections VIII and IX, we review the paradigms of entanglement (LOCC) and privacy theory (LOPC), and show the equivalence of key rates in the two paradigms. We then discuss and compare security criteria in these paradigms in part C of the Appendix. In Section X, we give a number of bound entangled states and show that they can produce a private key. The methods allow one to find a wide class of states which are bound entangled, because the fact that they have a key automatically ensures that they are entangled, which is usually the difficult part in showing that a state is bound entangled: the positive partial transposition (PPT) criterion can be quickly checked to see that the states are nondistillable. In Section XI, we prove that the relative entropy distance is an upper bound on the rate of a key.
In Section XII, a class of states with nonpositive partial transposition (NPT) is introduced which appear to be bound entangled. They are derived from a class of bound entangled private key states. An additional result discussed in Section XIII, which we only mentioned in passing in [35] , is that the bound entangled key states can be used as the basis of a cryptographic primitive we call a controlled private quantum channel (PQC). We conclude in Section XIV with a few open questions.
II. SECURITY CONTAINED IN QUANTUM STATES
In this section, we will introduce the class of states that contain at least one bit (or dit) of a perfectly secure key, which is directly accessible-these we call private bits (or dits). We discuss the properties of these states and argue the generality of this approach. In particular, we introduce the notion of twisting, which is a basic concept in dealing with private states.
A well-known state that contains one bit of a secure key which is directly accessible is the singlet state. After measuring it in a local basis, Alice and Bob obtain bits that are perfectly correlated with each other and completely uncorrelated with the rest of the world including an eavesdropper Eve. This is because the singlet state as a whole is decoupled from the environment, being a pure state. However, even if a state is mixed, it can contain a secure key. Yet the key must then be located only in a part of it. More formally, we consider a four-partite mixed state of two systems , belonging to Alice and , belonging to Bob. The subsystem of the state will be called the key part of the state-it is the part of the state that produces a key upon measurement. The subsystem will be called the shield of the state. It is called this, because its presence is what will cause the part of the state to be secure, by shielding information from an eavesdropper.
We assume the worst case scenario-that the state is the reduced density matrix of the pure state where we trace out the system belonging to eavesdropper Eve. We then distinguish a product basis in system . For our purposes, without loss of generality, we often choose to be the standard basis . Distinguishing the basis is connected with the fact that we are dealing with classical security, which finally is realized in some fixed basis. Now, consider the state of systems after measurement performed in the basis by Alice and Bob. This state is of the form (4) The above form of the state is usually called a ccq state. We will therefore refer to a ccq state associated with state , and it is understood that it is also related to chosen basis . The distribution will sometimes be referred to as the distribution of the ccq state.
We can now distinguish types of states via looking at their ccq states (always assuming that some fixed basis was chosen).
Definition 1:
A state is called secure with respect to a basis if the state obtained via measurement on subsystem of its purification in basis followed by tracing out subsystem (i.e., its ccq state) is product with Eve's subsystem (5) Such a state will be also called " secure." Moreover, if the distribution so that the ccq state is of the form (6) the state is said to have -key.
One can ask when two states and are equally secure with respect to a given product basis . First, let us define what does it mean "equally secure." A natural definition would be that when Alice and Bob measure systems in the basis, then Eve by any means cannot distinguish between two situations, as far as the outcomes of the measurement are concerned. In particular, the states are definitely equally secure, when their ccq states are equal.
For our purpose, we will need to know when for two states the latter relation holds. It is obvious that any unitary transformation applied to systems of the state will not change the ccq state. (Note that it cannot be just any CP map; for example, partial trace of systems would mean giving it to Eve, which of course would change the ccq states.) As will be demonstrated in Section V, we can actually do much more without changing the ccq state. Namely, we can apply an operation called "twisting." This operation is defined for system and with respect to a product basis of system as follows.
Definition 2:
Given product basis on systems , the unitary operation acting on system of the form (7) is called -twisting, or in short, twisting.
Finally, we define the class of private states. The states from that class are proven [35] to be the only quantum states that after measurement on Alice and Bob subsystems give an ideal key. In other words, these are the only states from which Alice and Bob can get an ideal ccq state (6) according to Definition 1 of security. For the sake of clarity, we recall this proof with details in Section III. (9) is called a basic pdit.
Remark 1:
Let us note that one could define states with an ideal key also in a different way than in Definition 1. Namely, we could say that the state has key iff it has a subsystem such that the subsystem of its purification is an ideal ccq state of (6), where . However, maximally entangled state is not of this form, but is locally equivalent to a state of this form, i.e., they would be transformable into one another by means of unitary embeddings or partial isometries. In fact, the whole class of so defined states with an ideally secure key would be locally equivalent to the one we have introduced in Definition 3, and by characterization of the latter, equivalent to the class of private states. Another definition of states with an ideal key could be as follows. A state is called to have a key if there are operations and with Kraus operators and , respectively, such that the ccq state of subsystems of the purification of an output state is an ideal ccq state of (6) . This definition however would not allow for easy characterization of this class of states, and still, such states would be locally equivalent to private states defined in Definition 3.
A. Some Facts and Notations
In what follows, by , we mean the trace norm, i.e., the sum of the singular values of an operator. For any bipartite operator , by , we mean the partial transposition of with respect to system 2, that is (10) where denotes the matrix transposition over system 2 of a matrix . For brevity, we will use the same symbol for any partial transposition. In particular, we deal often with systems of four subsystems , and we will take partial transposition with respect to subsystems and . Hence, denotes , with and denoting the matrix transposition on systems and , respectively. To give an example of a mixed notation, we consider . In block matrix form, such a state has a bipartite structure of blocks, so that it reads (11) This state after partial transposition with respect to a system reads (12) In the above equation, the partial transposition on the left-hand side (LHS) is with respect to the system and on the righthand side (RHS), only with respect to the system , as the partial transposition with respect to the system , which is a one qubit system, resulted already in appropriate reordering of the block operators . In what follows, we will repeatedly use equivalence of the trace norm distance and fidelity proved by Fuchs and van de Graaf [26] .
Lemma 1: For any states , , there holds (13) Here, is fidelity. We also use the Fannes inequality [25] (in the form of [2] ) (14) which holds for arbitrary states and satisfying .
B. On Twisting and Privacy Squeezing
Here we will show that twisting does not change the ccq state arising from measurement of the key part. Then, we will introduce a useful tool by showing that twisting can pump entanglement responsible for security of ccq state into the key part.
We have the following theorem.
Theorem 1:
For any state and any -twisting operation , the states and have the same ccq states with respect to (w.r.t.) , i.e., after measurement in basis , the corresponding ccq states are equal:
Proof: To show that subsystem is not affected by controlled unitary with a target on , we will consider the whole pure state (15) (without loss of generality, we take to be standard basis). After von Neumann measurement on and tracing out the part, the output state is the following: (16) Let us now subject to controlled unitary (17) and then on the output state perform a complete measurement on reading the output (18) Performing partial trace and summing over , , we obtain the same density matrix as in (16) , which ends the proof.
The above theorem states that two states that differ by some twisting have the same ccq state obtained by measuring their key parts, and tracing out their shields. However, since twisting does not affect only the ccq state, one can be interested in how the whole state changes when subjected to such an operation. We will show now an example of twisting, which will be of great importance for further considerations in this paper. Subsequently, we will construct from this a twisting of an operation called privacy squeezing (in short, p-squeezing), which shows the importance of the above theorem. The operation of p-squeezing is a kind of primitive in the paradigm, which we will present in this paper.
Consider the following technical lemma. where we omit nonimportant elements of . Proof: Twisting, by its definition (7), is determined by the set of unitary transformations. In the case of pbit, which we now consider, there are four unitary transformations that determine it:
. Let us consider a singular value decomposition of the operator to be with unitary transformations, and -nonnegative diagonal operator. Note that by unitary invariance of a norm, we have that . We then define twisting by choosing , , and . The subsystem of a twisted state is (20) so for such chosen twisting we have indeed that the element of the matrix of is equal to , which proves the assertion.
We will give now the following corollary, which will serve as a simple exemplification of this result.
Corollary 1:
Let the key part be two qubit system. Consider then a state of the form (where blocks are operators acting on a system)
There exists twisting such that the state after partial trace on has a form (22) Proof: The construction of the twisting is similar as in lemma above. This time one has to consider also the singular value decomposition of the operator .
We can see now that with any state , which has two qubit key part , we can associate a state obtained in the following way.
1) For state , find twisting , such that (according to Lemma 2) it changes upper-right element of subsystem of into .
2) Apply to obtaining . 3) Trace out the shield ( subsystem) of state obtaining two-qubit state (23) This operation will be called privacy squeezing, or in short, p-squeezing, and the state , which is the output of such operation on the state , will be called the p-squeezed state of the state . Sometimes we will use the term privacy squeezing in more informal sense, namely, with the twisting , which makes the key part close to maximally entangled state.
Note that the ccq state of p-squeezed state has no more secret correlations than that of the original state. This is because it emerges from the operation of twisting, which preserves security in some sense, i.e., it does not change the ccq state, which can be obtained from the original state. The next operation performed in definition of p-squeezed state is tracing out part, which means giving the subsystem to Eve. Such operation cannot increase security of the state in any possible sense.
We will be interested in applying p-squeezing in the case, where the key part of the initial state was weakly entangled, or completely separable. Then, the p-squeezing operation will make it entangled.
We can say that the operation of privacy squeezing pumps the entanglement of the state, which is distributed along subsystems into its key part . The entanglement once concentrated in the two qubit part may be much more powerful than the one spread over the whole system. Further, in this paper, we will see that from the bound entangled state, the operation of p-squeezing can produce approximately a maximally entangled state of two qubits. Then, the analysis of how much key one can draw from the ccq state is much easier in the case of the p-squeezing state.
III. GENERAL FORM OF STATES CONTAINING IDEAL KEY
In this section, we will provide general form of the states , which have key, i.e., states such that the outcomes of measurement in basis are both perfectly correlated and perfectly secure. It turns out that this is precisely the class of private states. Hence, the Definitions 1 and 3 are equivalent. We have the following theorem. (24) in the following, more appealing form: (25) where is a projector onto the maximally entangled state , and is arbitrary twisting operation (7).
Since the state has many matrix elements vanishing, not all unitaries from definition of twisting are actually used here. In fact, unitaries in (24) are to be identified with unitaries from (7) . Note that we can take to be "classically correlated" in the sense that it is diagonal in some product basis. Indeed, twisting can change the state into any other state having the same eigenvalues (simply, twisting can incorporate a unitary transformation acting solely on ). Thus, we see that the states that have a key are closely connected with the maximally entangled state, which has been so far a "symbol" of quantum security. As we will see, the maximally entangled state may get twisted so much that after measurement in many bases of the part the outcomes will be correlated with Eve, which is not the case for the maximally entangled state itself. Still, however, the basis will remain secure. Note that here we deal with perfect security. We will later discuss approximate security in Section V.
Proof: This part of the proof is a consequence of the theorem 1. Namely, a basic pdit (9) is obviously -secure, because it has maximal correlations in this basis, and moreover, it is a pure state, hence the one completely decoupled from Eve. More formally, it is evident that the ccq state of basic pdit is of the form (6). Now we can apply Theorem 1, which says that after twisting, the ccq state is unchanged. Hence, any state of the form (24) has also -key.
Proof: In this part, we assume that the state has -key, i.e., that after measurement on its part, one gets a perfectly correlated state (between Alice and Bob) that is uncorrelated with Eve (26) Let us consider general pure state for which dimensions of and are , dimensions of and are and , respectively, and the dimension of subsystem is the smallest one that allows for the whole state being a pure one (27) One can rewrite it as (28) with . It is easy to see that the scalar product equals the probability of obtaining the state on the system after measurement in basis . Now, since the subsystem (after measurement in on ) must be maximally correlated, the vectors should satisfy . We can normalize these states (in case ) to have (29) so that the total state has a form (30) "Cryptographical" interpretation of this state is the following: if Alice and Bob gets th result, then Eve gets a subsystem of a state . Indeed, the ccq state is then of the form (31) with . Now the condition (26) implies that should be all equal to each other. In particular, it follows that a rank of Eve's total density matrix is no greater than dimension of system, hence we can assume that . It is convenient to rewrite this pure state in a form (32) where is a standard basis of and of system and is matrix that fully represents this state. It is easy to check that . Consider now a singular value decomposition of given by where is now diagonal in basis . One then gets that . The state (32) may be rewritten (33) where is a transposition in basis . Now it is easy to check that subsystem of is in state , so that the whole state is the following:
We can express this state using states accessible to Eve, namely, However, as mentioned above, Eve's density matrices are equal to each other, i.e., for all . We then obtain (37) This completes the proof of Theorem 2.
IV. PDITS AND THEIR PROPERTIES
In this section, we will present various forms of pdits and pbits. We will first write the pbit in a matrix form according to its original definition. We can write it in a block form (38) where is an arbitrary state on subsystem, and and are arbitrary unitary transformations that act on . 1) "Generalized EPR Form" of a Pdit: Since by the theorem of the previous section pdits are the only states that contain -key, they could be called generalized EPR states (maximally entangled state). We have already seen that they are the "twisted EPR states." One can notice an even closer connection. Namely, a pdit can be viewed as an EPR states with operator amplitudes. Indeed, one can rewrite (34) in a more appealing form (39) with (40) We have written here (unlike in the rest the of this paper) first the system and then the one, so that this form of pdit would recall a form of pure state. Thus, instead of -numbers, the amplitudes are now -numbers, so that the states that have the key are "second quantized EPR states." In the case of pbits, the matrix form is the following: (41) Let us consider the polar decomposition of operators . From the definition of a pdit, it follows that the only constraint on these operators is the following: (42) where is a unitary transformation and is a normalized state as so is the state in the form (38) . This reflects the fact that just like the maximally entangled state has Schmidt coefficients with probably different phases, but the same amplitudes, the "maximally private" state can have the "operator Schmidt coefficients" that differ by (a counterpart of the phase) but have the same in polar decomposition (which is a counterpart of the amplitude).
There is yet another similarity to EPR states, namely, the norm of the upper-right block is equal to , like the modulus of the coherence of the EPR state.
2) " -Form" of Pbit: In special case of pbits, one can have a representation by just one normalized operator (43) for any operator satisfying . Justification of equivalence of this form and standard form is the following. Consider a singular value decomposition of with and unitary transformations and being diagonal, positive matrix. Since has a trace norm , the same is for , therefore it can be viewed as with being a legitimate state. Identifying and , we obtain the standard form.
It is important that in nontrivial cases should be a nonpositive operator. Otherwise, the pbit is equal to basic pbit. Indeed, if it is positive, then since its trace norm is , it is itself a legitimate state, which we call . Then, , so that which is the basic pbit (9) .
Note that in higher dimension to have the -form we need more than one operator, and the operators depend on each other, which is not as simple a representation as in the case of pbit. For example, in case, we have (44) where the operators and satisfy and for arbitrary unitary transformation .
3) "Flags Form"-Special Case of -Form: If the operator , which represents pbit in its -form, is additionally Hermitian, any such pbit can be seen as a mixture of basic pbit and a variation of basic pbit, which has EPR states with different phase (45) where . Derivation of this form is straightforward, if we consider a decomposition of into positive and negative part [9] (46) where and are by definition orthogonal and positive. Thus, denoting , together with an assumption of -form that , we can rewrite as (47) where are normalized positive and negative parts of . Moreover, since the states and are orthogonal , we obtain the form (45) .
A. Private Bits-Examples
We will give now two examples of private bits, and study its entanglement distillation properties.
Examples of pbit. 1) Let us consider state of the following form: (48) where is the swap operator which reads . If we consider positive and negative parts of , which are symmetric and antisymmetric subspaces, it is easy to see that (49) where (50) are symmetric and antisymmetric Werner states, and . Thus, we have obtained that it is also a pbit with natural "flags form," with flags being (orthogonal) Werner states [59] .
2) The second example is the state known as "flower state," which was shown [32] to lock an entanglement cost. We have that is of the form (51) where is classical maximally correlated state: , and is the embedding of unitary transformation with being Hadamard transform in the following way:
We can check now that this state is pbit with -form. In this case,
. To see this, consider unitary transformation . Composing with does not change the norm, which is unitarily invariant, so that (52) Thus, we see that . We have also (53) We will show now that in case of given in (48) , the distillable entanglement is strictly smaller than the amount of a secure key gained from these states. The formal definition of is given in Section VIII. Here it is enough to base it only on its intuitive properties. Namely, any pdit by its very definition has at least equal to of a key, which can be obtained by measuring its key part. To show the gap between a distillable entanglement and a distillable key, we will compute the value of another measure of entanglement: log-negativity (see [60] ) of the state, which is an upper bound on distillable entanglement [57] . To this end, consider the following lemma. 
B. Relative Entropy of Entanglement and Pdits
In this section, we will consider the entanglement contents of the pbit in terms of a measure of entanglement called relative entropy of entanglement, defined as follows: (56) where is the relative entropy, and is the set of separable states. In Section XI, we will show that for any state, the relative entropy of entanglement is an upper bound on the key rate that can be obtained from the state (for generalizations of this result to a wide class of entanglement monotones, see [13] and [14] ). It is then easy to see that for any pbit , is greater than since by definition of pdits. The issue we address here is the upper bound on the relative entropy of the pdit. We relate its value to the states that appear on the shield of the pdits, when Alice and Bob get the key by measuring the key part of the pdit. The theorem below states it formally.
Theorem 3: For any pdit
, which is secure in a standard basis, let denote states, which appear on shield of the pbit, after obtaining outcome in a measurement performed in a standard basis on its key part. Then, we have (57) where denotes the key and is the shield part of the pdit.
Proof: One can view the quantity as the relative entropy of dephased on in computational basis [32] . In case , it can be easily done with applying unitary -random sequence of and unitary transformations. In general case, one can use the so-called Weyl unitary operators (see, e.g., [27] ). Such an implementation of dephasing uses bits of randomness. Following the proof of nonlockability of relative entropy of entanglement [32] (see also [43] ), we can write (58) where and . As we have observed above, the relative entropy of dephased state equals , which ends the proof. The above theorem is valid also for regularized relative entropy, defined as [21] (59)
Theorem 4:
Under the assumptions of Theorem 3, there holds (60) For the proof of this theorem, as rather technical, we refer the reader to part F of the Appendix.
C. Irreducible Pbit-A Unit of Privacy
In Section III, we have characterized states that contain an ideal key, i.e., pdits. A pdit has an subsystem called here the key part.
bits of a key can be obtained from such a pdit by a complete measurement in some basis performed on this key part of pdit. However, as it follows from the characterization given in Theorem 2, pdits have also the subsystem, called here the shield. This part can also serve as a source of a key. Indeed there are plenty of such pdits that contain more than key, due to their shield. Therefore, not every pdit can serve as a unit of privacy and we need the following definition.
Definition 5: Any pdit (with -dimensional key part) for which is called irreducible.
This definition distinguishes those pdits for which measuring their key part is the optimal protocol for drawing a key. They are called irreducible in opposite to those, which can be reduced by distillation protocol to some other pdits, which have more than of key. Irreducible pdits are by definition units of privacy (although they are not generally interconvertible).
Determining the class of irreducible pdits is potentially a difficult task, as it leads to optimization over protocols of a key distillation. However, we are able to show a subclass of pdits, which are irreducible. To this end, we use a result, which is proven in Section XI, namely, that the relative entropy of entanglement is an upper bound on a distillable key. Having this, we can state the following proposition.
Proposition 1: Any pdit , with
, is irreducible.
Proof: By definition of , we have and by Theorem 9 from Section XI, we have , which is in turn less than by assumption, and the assertion follows. We can provide now a class of pdits, which have and by the above proposition are irreducible. These are pdits that have separable states that appear on shield conditionally on outcomes of complete measurement on a key part in the computational basis.
Proposition 2: For any pdit
, which is secure in standard basis, let denote the states, which appear on shield of the pbit, after obtaining the outcome in the measurement performed in standard basis on its key part. If are the separable states, then pdit is irreducible.
Proof: Due to bound on relative entropy of pdit given in Theorem 3, we have that is less than or equal to since conditional states are separable and hence have relative entropy of entanglement equal to zero.
is also not less then , since it is greater than the amount of a distillable key, which ends the proof.
Note that examples (48) and (51) given in Section IV-A fulfill the assumptions of this theorem, and are therefore irreducible pbits. They are also the first known nontrivial states (different than pure state) for which the amount of a distillable key has been calculated. Using the bound of relative entropy on a distillable key, one can also show that the class of maximally correlated states has , since for the latter .
V. APPROXIMATE PBITS
We present here a special property of states that are close to pbit. We have already seen that pbits have similar properties to the maximally entangled EPR states. In particular, the norm of the upper-right block in standard form as well as in -form of pbit is equal to . We will show here that for general states the norm of that block tells how close the state is to a pbit: any state that is close in trace norm to pbit must have the norm of this block close to , and vice versa.
We will need the following lemma that relates the value of coherence to the distance from the maximally entangled state for two qubit states.
Lemma 4:
For any bipartite state expressed on the form , we have (61) and (62) Proof: For the proof of this lemma, see part G of the Appendix.
We can prove now that approximate pbits have norm of an appropriate block close to .
Proposition 3:
If the state written in the form fulfills (63) for some pbit , then for there holds . Proof: The pbit is a twisted EPR state, which means that there exists twisting , which applied to basic pbit gives . We apply this to both states and and trace out the subsystem of both of them. Since these operations cannot increase the norm distance between these states, we have for (64) It implies, by equivalence of norm and fidelity (1) We have then (72) which, by equivalence of norm and fidelity (13) , gives (73) Let us now consider the state and its purification to Eve's subsystem so that we have (74) By the Fannes inequality [see (14) in Section II-A], we have that (75) From this, we will get that is of order of . We prove this as follows. Since norm distance is bounded by relative entropy as follows: [46] (76) one gets (77) The relative entropy distance of the state to its subsystems is equal to quantum mutual information (78) (we will henceforth use shorthand notation , ), which gives (79) where the last inequality comes from (75). Coming back to inequality (77), we have that (80) If we trace out the subsystem , the inequality is preserved (81) where we have put , as we deal with pbits. Now by triangle inequality, one has (82) We can apply now the bounds (73) and (81) to the above inequality obtaining (83) Let us now apply the twisting (transformation that is inverse to twisting ) to both states on the left-hand side of the above inequality. Since is defined as , we get that (84) i.e., our state is close to pbit . Then, the theorem follows with .
Remark 2:
The above propositions establish the norm of the upper-right block of matrix (written in computational basis according to order of subsystems), as a parameter that measures closeness to pbit, and in this sense, it measures the security of the bit obtained from the key part. The state of form (21) is close to a pbit if and only if the norm of this block is close to . This is the property of approximate pbits, however it seems not to have an analog for approximate pdits with .
VI. EXPRESSING ALICE AND BOB STATES IN TERMS OF EVE'S STATES
In this section, we will express the state in such a way that one explicitly sees Eve's states in it. We will then interpret the results of the previous sections in terms of such a representation. In particular, we will see that the norm of the upper-right block not only measures closeness to pbit, but it also measures the security of the bit from the key part directly, in terms of fidelity between the corresponding Eve's states.
A. The Case Without Shield: "Abelian" Twisting
Consider first the easier case of a state without shield, i.e., Moreover, if a state satisfies security condition approximately, it must be close in fidelity to some state . The quality of the bit of a key is given by magnitude of a c-number .
B. The General Case
In this section, we will represent in terms of Eve's states the state that has both key part and shield. We will see then, how the twisting becomes "nonabelian," and the condition of closeness to pure state changes into that of closeness to pbit. If we write the state in basis of a system (key part), we get blocks instead of matrix elements (96) After suitable transformations (see part A of the Appendix for details), we arrive at the following form:
where the operator maps the space exactly onto a support of in space , and the dual operator maps the support of back to . Let us note that in parallel to (88), we have that the trace norms of the blocks are connected with fidelities between Eve's states (98) 1) The Case of Two-Qubit Key Part: If the key part is a two-qubit system, we get (99), shown at the bottom of the next page.
Let us now discuss the conditions for presence of one bit of a key. They are again: i)
and ii) Eve's states are the same . This is equivalent to (100) which is nothing but trace norm of upper-right block . Also conditions for approximate bit of a key require the norm to be close to . Moreover, to see how pbit and the twisting arise, let us put all Eve's states equal to each other, and probabilities corresponding to perfect correlations. We then obtain (101) where is one fixed state that Eve has irrespectively of outcomes. We see here almost the form of pbit. One difference might be that instead of usual unitaries, we have some embeddings . However, since now Eve's space is of the same dimension as (because Eve has single state), they are actually usual unitaries. The transposition does not really make a difference, as it can be absorbed both by state and by unitaries. It is interesting to see here in place of phases from previous section that the unitaries appeared, so that abelian twisting changed into nonabelian one. Also the condition for a key changed from modulus of c-number (matrix element) to a trace norm of q-number (a block).
VII. OVERVIEW
In this section, we will shortly summarize what we have done so far. Then we will describe the goals of this paper, and briefly outline how we will achieve them.
A. Pbits and Twisting
We have considered a state shared by Alice and Bob, which was divided into two parts: the key part and the shield . The key part is measured in a local basis, while the shield is kept. The latter is seen by Eve as an environment that may restrict her knowledge about outcomes of measurement performed on the pdit.
We have shown two important facts. First, we have characterized all the states for which measurement on the key part gives the perfect key. The states are called pdits, and they have a very simple form. Moreover, we have shown that twisting does not change the ccq state arising from measurement on the key part. (We should emphasize here that twisting must be controlled by just the same basis in which the measurement is performed.) This is an interesting feature, because twisting may be a nonlocal transformation. Thus even though we apply a nonlocal transformation to the state, the quality of the key established by measuring the key part (in the same basis) does not change. From the exhibited examples of pbits, we have seen that some of them have very small distillable entanglement. Since pbits are EPR states subjected to twisting, we see that in this case the twisting must have been very nonlocal, since it significantly diminished distillable entanglement. Because pbits contain at least one bit of a secure key, we have already seen that the distillable key can be much larger than distillable entanglement.
However, our main goal is to show that there are bound entangled states from which one can draw key. Thus, we need distillable entanglement to be strictly zero. Here it is easily seen that any perfect pdit is an NPT state. Even more, one can show that pdits are always distillable [40] . Thus we cannot realize our goals by analyzing perfect pbits.
B. Approximating Pbits With PPT States
After realizing that pbits cannot be bound entangled, one finds that this still does not exclude bound entangled states with a private key. Namely, even though bound entangled states cannot contain the exact key (as they would be pbits then), they may contain almost exact key. Such states would be in some sense close to pbits. Note that this would be impossible, if the only states containing perfect key were maximally entangled state. Indeed, for system if only a state has greater overlap than with a maximally entangled state, we can distill singlets from it [6] .
Recall that for a state with a key part being two qubits, the measure of quality of the bit of a key coming from measuring the key part is trace norm of upper-right block. The key is perfect if the norm is (we have then pbit) and it is close to perfect, if the norm is close to . Thus our first goal will be to find bound entangled states having the trace norm of that block arbitrarily close to . We will actually construct such PPT states (hence bound entangled) in Sections X-A and X-B. In this way, we will show that there exist bound entangled states that contain an arbitrarily (though not perfectly) secure bit of a key.
C. Nonzero Rate of Key From Bound Entangled States
It is not enough to construct bound entangled states with arbitrary secure single bit of a key. The next important step is to show that given many copies of states, one can draw nonzero asymptotic rate of a secure key. To show this, we will employ (in Section X-C) the states with almost perfect bit of a key. Let us outline here the most direct way of proving the claim.
To be more specific, we will consider many copies of states which have upper-right block trace norm equal to . We will argue that one can get a key by measuring the key part of each of them, and then process the outcomes via local classical manipulations and public discussion. How can one can get nonzero rate in this way?
We will first argue that the situation is the same, as if the outcomes were obtained from a state that is close to maximally entangled. To this end, we will apply the idea of privacy squeezing described in Section II-B.
First, recall that we have shown that operation of twisting does not change security of ccq state; more precisely, it does not change the state of the Eve's system and the key part of Alice and Bob systems, which would arise, if Alice and Bob measured the key part. Thus, whatever twisting we will apply, from cryptographic point of view, the situation will not change. The total state will change, yet this can be noticed only by those who have access to the shield of Alice and Bob systems, and Eve does not have such access.
(99)
We will choose such a twisting that will change the upperright block of into a positive operator. This is exactly the one which realizes privacy squeezing of this state. Now, even though security is not changed, the state is changed in a very favorable way for our purposes. Namely, we can now trace out the shield, and the remaining state of the key part (a p-squeezed state of the initial one) will be close to maximally entangled state. Indeed, twisting does not change trace norm of the upper-right block. Because now the block is a positive operator, its trace norm is equal to its trace, and tracing out shield amounts just to evaluating the trace of blocks. Since the trace norm was , the upper-right element of the state of a key part is equal to , which means that the state is close to maximally entangled (where the corresponding element is equal to ). One can worry that it is now not guaranteed that the security is the same, because we have performed not only twisting, but also partial trace over shield. However, the latter operation could only make situation worse, since partial trace means giving the traced system to Eve. Now the only remaining thing is to show that we can draw a key from data obtained by measuring many copies of state close to an EPR state, then definitely we can draw a key from many copies of more secure ccq state obtained from our . To achieve this goal, we thus need some results about drawing a key from ccq state. Let us recall that we work in scenario, where Alice and Bob are promised to share independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) state, so that the ccq state is tensor product of identical copies. In this case, the needed results have been provided in [19] . It follows that the rate of a key is at least , where is mutual information. If instead of almost-EPR state we have just an EPR state, the above quantity is equal to . Indeed, perfect correlations and perfect randomness of outcomes give and purity of the EPR state gives . Since we have state close to an EPR state, due to continuity of entropies, we will get and . Thus given copies of states that approximate pbits, one can get almost bits of a key in limit of large .
D. Drawing Key and Transforming Into Pbits by LOCC
Apart from showing that a key can be drawn from states, we want to develop the theory of a key distillation from quantum states. To this end in Section VIII, we recast the definition of distilling a key in terms of distilling pbits by local operations and classical communication. This is an important change of viewpoint: drawing a key requires referring to Eve, while distilling pbits by LOCC concerns solely bipartite states shared by Alice and Bob, and never requires explicit referring to Eve's system. Thus, we are able to pass from the game involving three parties: Alice, Bob, and Eve to the two players game, involving only Alice and Bob.
We will employ two basic tools: i) the concept of making a protocol coherent and ii) the fact (which we will prove) that having almost perfectly secure ccq state is equivalent to having a state close to some pdit. Note that in one direction, the reasoning is very simple: if we can get nonzero rate of asymptotically perfect pdits by LOCC, we can also measure them at the end, and get in this way asymptotically perfect ccq states, which is ensured by item ii). The converse direction is a little bit more involved: we take any protocol that produces a key, apply it coherently, and this gives pure final state of Alice, Bob, and Eve's systems. From ii), it follows that the total state of Alice and Bob must be close to pdit.
Let us briefly discuss how we will show the fact ii). The essential observation is that both the ccq state and Alice and Bob total state are reductions of the same pure state . Here some explanation is needed: in general, since the ccq state is obtained by measurement, it is not a reduction of . However, one can first apply the measurement coherently to the state . Then the ccq of the new state is indeed the reduction of . In the actual proof, we will proceed in a slightly different way. Now, if we have two nearby ccq states, we can find their purifications that are close to each other as well. Then, also Alice and Bob states arising when we trace out Eve's system are close to each other (because partial trace can only make states closer). The whole argument is slightly more complicated, but the above reasoning is the main tool.
The equivalence we obtain puts the task of drawing a key into the standard picture of state manipulations by means of LOCC. The theory of such manipulations is well developed and, in particular, there are quite general methods of obtaining bounds on transition rates (in our case, the transition rate is just a distillable key); see [36] . Indeed, we will be able to show that relative entropy of entanglement is an upper bound for a distillable key. The main idea of deriving the bound is similar to the methods from LOCC state manipulations. However, significant obstacles arise, to overcome which we have developed essentially new tools.
VIII. TWO DEFINITIONS OF DISTILLABLE KEY: LOCC AND LOPC PARADIGMS
In this section, we show that distillable amount of pdits by use of LOCC denoted by is equal to a classical secure key distillable by means of local operations and public communication (LOPC).
A. Distillation of Pdits
We have established a family of states-pdits-which have the following property: after measurement in some basis , they give a perfect dit of a key. In entanglement theory, one of the important aims is to distill singlets (maximally entangled states), which leads to an operational measure of distillable entanglement. We will pose now an analogous task, namely, distilling pdits (private states), which are of the form (8) . This gives rise to a definition of a distillable key, i.e., maximal achievable rate of distillation of pdits. Similarly, as in the case of distillation of singlet, it is usually not possible to distill exact pdits. Therefore, the formal definition of a distillable key will be a bit more involved. where is a pdit whose key part is of dimension .
For given protocol , its rate is given by
The distillable key of state is given by
In other words, due to this definition, Alice and Bob given copies of state try to get a state that is close to some pdit state with . Unlike so far in entanglement theory, effect of distillation of a quantum key depends not only on the number of copies of initial state but also on the choice of the output state. This is because private dits appear not to be reversibly transformable with each other by means of LOCC operations, as it is in case of maximally entangled states in LOCC entanglement distillation. Thus, the quantity is a rate of distillation to the large class of states. (Of course, since the definition involves optimization, is well defined; in particular, the expensive pdits will be suppressed.)
One can be interested now in the question if this new parameter of states has an operational meaning for quantum cryptography. One connection is obvious: given a quantum state, Alice and Bob may try to distill some pdit state, and hence get (according to the above definition) bits of a key if such distillation has nonzero rate. However, the question arises: Is it the best way of extraction of a classical secure key from a quantum state (for example, given a quantum state is the largest amount of a classical key distillable from a state equal to )? We will give to this question a positive answer now. It means that distilling private dits, i.e., states of the form (24) is the best way of distilling a classical key from a quantum state.
B. Distillable Classical Secure Key: LOPC Paradigm
The issue of drawing a classical secure key from a quantum state is formally quite different from the definition of drawing pdits. However, it will turn out that it is essentially the same thing. In the LOCC paradigm, we have an initial state hold by Alice and Bob who apply to it an LOCC map, and obtain a final state . Thus, the LOCC paradigm is essentially a bipartite paradigm.
In the paradigm of drawing secure classical key (see, e.g., [12] and [13] ), there are three parties, Alice, Bob, and Eve. They start with some joint state where subsystems , , and belong to Alice, Bob, and Eve, respectively. Now, Alice and Bob essentially perform again some LOCC operations. However, we have now a tripartite system, and we should know how that operation acts on the whole system. 
where . Here the subsystem carries the message to be sent, and the subsystems and of Bob and Eve represent the received message.
Let us note that LOCC operations can be defined in the same way; the only difference is that we drop Eve's systems (both and ) and corresponding operators. Now, drawing a secure key means obtaining the following state:
by means of LOPC. Since output states usually cannot be exactly , Alice and Bob will get state of the ccq form (4) i.e., We will discuss relations between this condition, and security criteria (108) and (110) as well as with uniformity criterion (111) in part C of the Appendix.
For the purpose of the definition of a secret key rate in this paper, we apply the joint criterion (112). Consequently, we adopt the following measure of a distillable classical secure key from a quantum tripartite state. 
C. Comparison of Paradigms
Let us compare Definitions 6 and 9 of distilling a cryptographical key. The difference is mostly that the first one deals only with bipartite system, and the goal is to get the desired final state by applying a class of LOCC operations. Within the second paradigm, we have tripartite state and we want to get a wanted state by means of LOPC operations. Thus, the first paradigm is much more standard in quantum information theory. The second one comes from the classical security theory (see, e.g., [44] ), where probability distributions of triples of random variables are being processed. In Section VIII-D, we will see that if the tripartite initial state is pure, the two paradigms are tightly connected. In the case of distillation of an exact key, they are almost obviously identical, while in the inexact case, the only issue is to make the asymptotic security requirements equivalent. We will see that an output pdit obtained by LOCC implies some ccq state obtained by LOPC, and vice versa.
D. Composability Issues
In this paper, we consider the promised scenario, which is the first step to consider in unconditionally secure quantum key distribution (QKD). 1 The latter security definition is required to be universally composable, which means that a QKD protocol can be used as a subroutine of any other cryptographic protocol [3] , [4] , [48] . To this end, one needs to choose carefully the measure of security. Our starting point is the LOPC paradigm, where the measure of security is the trace norm. This is compatible with [3] , where it was shown that such security measure implies indeed composability (see [3, eq. (10)]). In particular, if we concatenate QKD protocols with security measured by trace norm between the obtained state and the ideal target, the overall protocol will have security bounded by . Thus trace norm in LOPC paradigm can be called composable security condition.
However, we want to recast QKD within the LOCC paradigm, i.e., in terms of distance between Alice and Bob states rather than tripartite states. In this spirit, in [3] , it is shown that fidelity with maximally entangled state implies composability, in the sense that if fidelity is , then the norm is bounded by (see [3, eq. (20) ]). This may seem a bit uncomfortable, because while composing many protocols, we now have to add not epsilons, but rather their square roots. However, one can see that it is in general not possible to do better while starting from fidelity. Due to inequality [26] , we can equally well use the trace norm. Indeed it will give us at worst the bound for composable security condition in the LOPC paradigm.
In our paper, we have a more general situation, i.e., we deal with distance to private states rather than just maximally entangled states. According to the above discussion, we have decided to use trace norm in LOCC scenario. In our techniques, in the mid-steps, we will use fidelity, hence we are again left with . We do not know, whether one can omit fidelity, and get rid of the square root.
Having said all that, we should emphasize that finally the minimal requirement is that security is an exponentially decreasing function of some security parameter, whose role can play, e.g., the number of all qubits in the game. This condition is of course not spoiled by square root. (An example of a situation, where this requirement is not met, was conjectured in [3] and then proved in [42] ). In our paper, we will derive equivalences between various security conditions, and the word "equivalence" will be understood in the sense of not spoiling the proper exponential dependence on total number of qubits. In particular, the security conditions will be called equivalent also when they differ by the factor polynomial in number of qubits (see, e.g., [30] ).
IX. EQUALITY OF KEY RATES IN LOCC AND LOPC PARADIGMS
In this section, we will show that Definitions 6 and 9 give rise to the same quantities. In this way, the problem of drawing a key within original LOPC paradigm is recast in terms of transition to a desired state by LOCC. First, we will describe a coherent version of LOPC protocol. Then, we will use it to derive equivalence in exact case (where protocols produce as outputs ideal ccq states or ideal pdits). Subsequently, we will turn to the general case where inexact transitions are allowed.
A. Coherent Version of LOPC Key Distillation Protocol
The main difference between LOPC and LOCC paradigms is that in the first one we have transformations between tripartite states shared by Alice, Bob, and Eve, while in the latter one, between bipartite states shared by Alice and Bob. Thus, in LOPC paradigm, the part of the state held by Alice and Bob does not, in general, tell us about security. To judge if Alice and Bob have a secure key, we need the whole state. Security is assured by the lack of correlations of this state with Eve. Thus, if we want to recast the task of drawing a key in terms of LOCC paradigm, we need to consider such LOCC protocol, which produces output state that assures security of a key itself. We will do this by considering coherent version of LOPC key distillation protocols (cf., [19] and [41] ).
The most important feature of the version will be that given any LOPC protocol, starting with some initial pure state and ending up with some ccq state , its coherent version will end up with a state such that tracing out part will give exactly the ccq state . In this way, the total Alice and Bob state will keep the whole information about Eve (because up to unitary on Eve's system, purification is unique).
In coherent version of a key distillation protocol, Alice and Bob perform their local operations in a coherent way, i.e., by adding ancillas, performing unitary transformations and putting aside appropriate parts of the system. This additional part of the system is discarded in the usual protocol. However, holding this part allows one to keep the total state of Alice, Bob, and Eve pure in each step of the protocol. This is because we use pure ancillas and pure initial state, and apply only unitary transformations that preserve purity.
Alice and Bob can also perform public communication. Its coherent version is that, e.g., Bob and Eve apply C-NOT 2 operations to Alice's subsystem, which holds the result of measurement. Such a coherent version of LOPC protocol has the following two features: i) keeps the state pure, and ii) after tracing out subsystems that are put aside, we obtain exactly the same state as in the original protocol. Now we are in position to construct for a given LOPC protocol a suitable LOCC protocol, which will output pbits when the former protocol will output an ideal key. Namely, we replace the local operations from LOPC protocol with their coherent versions. We take the public communication in original-incoherent-form (of course, without broadcast to Eve since we now deal with bipartite states). One notes that such operation produces the same state of Alice and Bob as the one produced by coherent version of the original LOPC protocol traced out over Eve's system. This is because, if we trace out Eve, then there is no difference between coherent and incoherent versions of public communication.
Thus, from an LOPC protocol, we have obtained some LOCC protocol, a special one, where local systems are not traced out. In this way, one gets a bridge which joins the two approaches, and shows that different definitions of distillable key are equivalent. In particular, suppose that the LOPC protocol produced the ideal ccq state. Then, the output of LOCC protocol obtained as a coherent version of this protocol will produce a state that (due to Theorem 2) must be a pdit. (For a more detailed analysis of switching between LOPC and LOCC see [31] .) Remark 3: Of course, the notion of coherent version does not need to concern just some LOPC protocol. Also, an LOCC operation, which contained measurements and partial traces, can be made coherent, which in view of the above considerations means simply that the systems are not traced out, but only "kept aside" and measurements are replaced by appropriate local unitaries. Actually, if we include all pure ancillas that will be added in the course of realizing the LOCC operation, the coherent version of the operation is nothing but a closed LOCC operation [38] introduced for sake of counting local resources such as local information. One can think of the shield part as being the state of all the lab equipment and quantum states, left over from the process of key distillation.
B. Equivalence of Paradigms: The Case of Exact Key
Here we will consider the ideal case, where the distillation of the key gives exactly the demanded output state. One can state it formally and observe the following. (106), then the coherent application of due to Theorem 2 and discussion of Section IX-A will produce pdit of the same dimension. Conversely, if by LOCC, Alice and Bob can get a pdit, then after measurement, again by Theorem 2, they will obtain exact ccq state (106) of the same dimension.
C. Distillation of Classical Key and Distillation of Pdits-Equivalence in General (Asymptotically Exact) Case
We will prove here the theorem, which implies that even in nonexact case, distillation of pdits from initial bipartite state by LOCC is equivalent to distillation of a key by LOPC from initial pure state that is purification of the bipartite state. This in turn means that the rates in both paradigms are equal. Now by equivalence between norm and fidelity (13), we can rewrite this inequality as follows:
By definition of fidelity (126) where maximum is taken over all purifications and of and , respectively, we can fix one of these purification arbitrarily, and optimize over the other one. Let us then choose such a purification of , which is the output of coherent application of the mentioned protocol . There exists purification of such that its overlap with is greater than . Since the fidelity can only increase after partial trace applied to both states, it will be still greater than once we trace over Eve's subsystem. Thus, we have (127) where and are partial traces of and , respectively. The state (partial trace of ) comes from purification of an ideal state, and by the very same definition, it is some pdit state . At the same time, the state (partial trace of ) is the one that is the output of coherent application of protocol . Thus, by coherent version of , Alice and Bob can obtain state close to pdit, which proves the "if" part of the theorem.
To obtain equivalence, let us prove now the converse implication. The proof is a sort of "symmetric reflection" of the proof of the previous part.
This time we assume that there exists LOCC protocol starting with , ending up with final state with key part of dimension, which is close to some pdit in norm, i.e., (128) Due to equivalence between fidelity and norm, we have (129) The total state after protocol is , and if partially traced over Eve, it returns . Then, we can find such , purification of , that . Now let Alice and Bob measure the key part and trace out the shield. Then, out of , we get some ccq state . The same operation applied to gives ideal ccq state (106) . The operation can only increase the fidelity, so that (130) Returning to norms, we get (131)
X. DISTILLING KEY FROM BOUND ENTANGLED STATES
In this section, we will provide a family of states. Then we will show that for certain regions of parameters they have positive partial transpose (which means that they are nondistillable). Subsequently, we will show that out of the above PPT states one can produce, by an LOCC operation, states arbitrarily close to pbits (which also implies that they are entangled, hence bound entangled). More precisely, for any , we will find PPT states, from which by an LOCC protocol, one gets with some probability a state -close to some pbit. Since LOCC preserves the PPT property, this shows that pbits can be approximated with arbitrary accuracy by PPT states, in sharp contrast with maximally entangled states. We then show how to get from a state sufficiently close to a pbit an asymptotically nonvanishing rate of a key. We obtain it by reducing the problem to drawing a key from states that are close to the maximally entangled state.
A. The New Family of PPT States
Here we will present a family of states, and determine the range of parameters for which the states are PPT. The idea of construction of the family is based on the so-called hiding states found by Eggeling and Werner in [22] . Let us briefly recall this result. In [20] and [53] , it was shown that one can hide one bit of information in two states by correlating the bit of information with a pair of states, which are almost indistinguishable by use of LOCC operations, yet being almost distinguishable by global operations. The resulting state with the hidden bit is of the form (132) In [22] , it was shown that there are separable states, which can serve as arbitrarily good hiding states. These states are (133) where and are symmetric and antisymmetric Werner states (50). The higher the parameter is, the more indistinguishable by LOCC protocols the states become.
We adopt the idea of hiding bits to hide the entanglement. Namely, instead of bits, one can correlate two orthogonal maximally entangled states with these two hiding states and get the state (134) Let us recall that our purpose is to get the family of states, which though entangled, are not distillable and can approximate pdit states. Then the choice of as a starting point has double advantage. First, because and are hiding, will not allow for distillation of entanglement by just distinguishing them. Second, the hiding states are separable, so they do not bring in any entanglement to the state . However, the state (134) In subscript, we explicitly write the parameters on which this state depends implicitly: is the dimension of symmetric and antisymmetric Werner states used for hiding states (133) and is a parameter of tensoring in their construction. We will see that for some range of , almost every state of this family is a PPT state. We formalize it in the next lemma. 
B. Approximating Pbits by PPT States
We have just established a family such that for certain , , and , they are PPT states. We will then show that by LOCC one can transform some of them to a state close to pbits. More precisely, for any fixed accuracy, we will always find , , and such that it is possible to reach pbit up to this accuracy, starting from some number of copies of and applying LOCC operations.
Subsequently, we will show that one can always choose the initial states to be PPT. Since LOCC operations do not change PPT property, we will in this way show that there are PPT states that approximate pbits to arbitrarily high accuracy.
We will first prove the following theorem.
Theorem 6: For any and any , there exists state from family of state (136) such that for some from one can get by LOCC (with nonzero probability of success) a state satisfying for some private bit .
Proof: First, let us notice that by Theorem 4 it is enough to show that one can transform into a state , which has sufficiently large norm of the upper-right block.
Let Alice and Bob share copies of a state from the family (136). The number and parameters of this state will be fixed later. Now let Alice and Bob apply the well-known recurrence protocol-ingredient of protocols of distillation of singlet states [8] . Namely, they take one system in state as source system, and iterate the following procedure. In the th step, they take one system in state , and treat it as a target system. Let us remind that both systems have four subsystems , , , and . To distinguish the source and target system, we call , , , and the corresponding subsystems of a target system. On the source and target system, they both perform a C-NOT gate with a source at the part of a source system and target at part of a target system for Alice (Bob), respectively. Then, they both measure the and subsystem of the target system in computational basis, respectively, and compare the results. If the results agree, they proceed to the protocol, getting rid of the subsystem. If they do not agree, they abort the protocol. With nonzero probability of success, they can perform this operation times having each time the same source system, and some fresh target system in state . That is, they start with systems in state , and in each step (upon success), they use up one system and pass to the next step.
One can easily check that the submatrices (blocks) of the state , which survives steps of this recurrence protocol (which clearly happens with nonzero probability), are equal to the -fold tensor power of the elements of initial matrix , as shown in (139) where second equality is a consequence of the fact that and have orthogonal supports, which give that is orthogonal to any term in expansion of but the one . Thus, the result is equal to the norm of [which is ] plus norm of the difference , which gives (141). Thus, the norm of the upper-right block of the state (139) is given by (142)
We want now to see, if we can make the norm to be arbitrary close to . (Then by Lemma 4, the state will be arbitrary close to a pbit.) Since , we get that converges to with . Although increasing diminishes the term , we can first fix large enough, so that the whole expression (142) will be as close to as it is required. Now we have the following situation. We know that for if is close to , then the state (139) is close to pbit. On the other hand, from Lemma 5, it follows that for i) and ii) the state is PPT, hence also the state (139) is PPT (because it was obtained from the former one by LOCC operation). If we now fix from interval , then by choosing high and for such , high enough , then the state (139) is close to pbit. Now, we can fix also and , and choose so large that the condition ii) is also fulfilled so that the state becomes PPT. This proves the following theorem, which is the main result of this section.
Theorem 7:
PPT states can be arbitrarily close to pbit in trace norm.
Here might be the appropriate place to note an amusing property of state (134). Namely, Eve knows one bit of information about Alice and Bob's state-she knows the phase of their Bell state. But she only has one bit of information about their state, thus it cannot be that she also knows the bit of their state, which is the key. In some sense, giving Eve the bit of phase information means that she cannot know the bit value.
C. Distillation of Secure Key
In Section X-B, we have shown that private bits can be approximated by PPT states. Now, the question is whether given many copies of one of such PPT states Alice and Bob can get nonzero rate of a classical key. Below, we will give the positive answer.
The main idea of the proof is to show that from the PPT state that is close to pbit Alice and Bob by measuring can obtain ccq state that satisfies the conditions of protocol found by Devetak and Winter (DW protocol) [19] . Namely, they have shown that for an initial cqq state (state which is classical only on Alice's side; this includes ccq state as a special case) between Alice, Bob, and Eve 139) where stands for the von Neumann entropy of an (sub)system of the state .
Using the above result, we can prove now that from many copies of states close to a pbit, one can draw nonzero asymptotic rate of a key.
Lemma 6: If a state is close enough to pbit in trace norm, then . Proof: The idea of the proof is as follows. Suppose that is close to pbit . We then consider twisting that changes into basic pbit with some state on . We apply twisting to both states, so that they are still close to each other. Of course, this is only a mathematical tool: Alice and Bob cannot apply twisting, which is usually a nonlocal operation. The main point is that after twisting, according to Theorem 1, the ccq state does not change. If we now trace out systems , the resulting state will be close to maximally entangled, and the resulting ccq state will be at most worse from Alice and Bob's point of view (because tracing out means giving to Eve). What we have done is just applying a sort of privacy squeezing of the state . Now, the latter ccq state has come from the measurement of a state close to the maximally entangled one. Thus, the task reduces to estimate quantities and for a ccq state obtained from measuring the maximally entangled state. However, due to suitable continuities, the first one is close to and the second one is close to . Now by DW protocol, one can draw a pretty high rate of a key from such ccq state. Let us now proceed with the formal proof.
We assume that for some pbit , we have
Let us consider twisting , which changes pdit into a basic pdit. Existence of such is assured by Theorem 2. If both states and are subjected to this transformation, the norm is preserved, so that (146) Also due to Theorem 1, the ccq state obtained by measuring a key part of is the same as that from . Now, the amount of a key drawn from such ccq state will not increase if we trace out shield. Thus, we apply such partial trace to and to , and by monotonicity of trace norm, we get (147) It is now enough to show that from ccq state obtained by measuring , one can get nonzero rate of a key. To this end, let us note that for ccq state obtained from any bipartite state by measuring its purification on subsystems and in computational basis, we have the following bound for :
Now, since our state is close to , for which and , we can use continuity of entropy to bound these quantities for the state. From Fannes inequality [see (14) in Section II-A], we get
Thus, we obtain that
This ends the proof of Lemma 6.
Let us note here that it was not necessary to know that the state is close to pbit. Rather, it was enough to know that trace norm of upper-right block is close to , as we have proved that it is equivalent to previous condition (see Section V) . From this it follows that after twisting and tracing out , the resulting state is close to the EPR state, which ensures nonzero rate of a key (actually, the rate is close to ).
We now can combine the lemma with the fact that we know PPT states that are close to pbit, to obtain the fact that there exist PPT states from which one can draw a secure key. The states must be entangled, as from separable states one cannot draw a key. Namely, separable state can be established by public discussion. If it could then serve as a source of a secret key, one could obtain a secret key by public discussion, which cannot be possible. For formal arguments, see [17] . Thus, our PPT states are entangled. But, since they are PPT, one cannot distill singlets from them [37] , hence they are bound entangled. In this way, we have obtained the following theorem.
Theorem 8:
There exist bound entangled states with .
We have split the way towards bound entangled states with a nonzero key into two parts. First, we have shown that from PPT states by recurrence one can get a state that is close to pbit. Then, we have shown that from a state close to pbit one can draw a private key.
Note that we have two quite different steps: recurrence was the quantum operation preformed on quantum Alice and Bob states, while DW protocol in our case is a classical processing of the outputs of measurement. We could unify the picture in two ways. First, Alice and Bob could measure the key part of the initial state and preform recurrence classically (since the quantum recurrence is merely coherent application of classical protocol). Then, the whole process of drawing a key from would be classical (of course, taking into account that Eve has quantum states). On the other hand, the DW protocol could be applied coherently, so that until the very end, we would have quantum state of Alice and Bob.
The result we have obtained allows to distinguish two measures of entanglement. In the next section, we will also show that is different than entanglement cost, as it is bounded by relative entropy of entanglement.
XI. RELATIVE ENTROPY OF ENTANGLEMENT AS AN UPPER BOUND ON DISTILLABLE KEY
In this section, we will provide a complete proof of the announced theorem [35] , which gives a general upper bound on a distillable key . This upper bound is given by regularized relative entropy of entanglement (56) . The relative entropy of entanglement [55] , [56] is given by (153) where is a relative entropy, and infimum is taken over all separable states . The regularized version of is given by
The limit exists, and due to subadditivity of , we have
It follows that also relative entropy of entanglement is upper bounded for . We recall now the following lemma obtained in [35] , the proof of which we provide in part H of the Appendix.
Lemma 7: Consider a set
, where is -twisting with being a standard product basis in . Let and . We have then (156) where .
We will also need asymptotic continuity of the relative entropy distance from some set of states obtained in [21] in the form of [51] .
Proposition 6: For any compact, convex set of state that contains maximally mixed state, the relative entropy distance from this set given by (157) is asymptotically continuous, i.e., it satisfies (158) for any states , acting on Hilbert space of dimension , with with .
Let us mention that the original relative entropy of entanglement [55] has in place of the set of separable states. Another version has been considered in [47] , where was a set of PPT states. The latter set has entangled states, but they can be only weakly entangled. In contrast, we will have a set in which there may be quite strongly entangled states.
We are now in position to formulate and prove the main result of this section. (160) where (161) and (162) with being pdit with dimension of the key part. We will present the chain of (in)equalities Inequality (163) is due to the fact that relative entropy does not increase under completely positive maps; in particular, it cannot increase under LOCC action applied to its both arguments (second argument becomes other separable state since LOCC operations cannot create entanglement). In (164), we perform twisting controlled by the basis in which state is secure (without loss of generality, we can assume it is a standard basis). The equality follows from the fact that unitary transformation does not change the relative entropy. In (165), we trace out subsystem of both states, which only decreases the relative entropy. After this operation, the first argument is , which is a state close to the EPR state ( would be equal to the EPR state if were exactly pdit), while the second argument becomes some-not necessarily separable-state . The state belongs to the set constructed as follows. We take a set of separable states on system subject to twisting and subsequently trace out the subsystem. The inequality (166) holds, because we take infimum over all states from the set of the function . This minimized version is named as it is a relative entropy distance of from the set . Let us check now that set fulfills the conditions of Proposition 6. Convexity of this set is obvious, since (for fixed unitary ) by linearity it is due to convexity of the set of separable states. This set contains the identity state, since it contains maximally mixed separable state, which is unitarily invariant (i.e., invariant under ) and whose subsystem by definition is the maximally mixed state as well. Thus, by Proposition 6, we have that is asymptotically continuous (170) where we assume that the EPR state is of local dimension . Since and come out of and by the same transformation described above (twisting, and partial trace), which does not increase norm distance, by (162) Now we divide both sides by and take the limit. Then, the left-hand side converges to . Due to (162), , and due to (161), . Thus, due to continuity of , we obtain (175) As an application of the above upper bound, we consider now the relation between distillable key and entanglement cost. For maximally entangled states, these two quantities are, of course, equal, unlike for general pdits. As an example, let us consider again a flower state given in (51) . As follows from [32] , the flower state has strictly greater than the relative entropy of entanglement. Since by the above theorem we have , having , we obtain in this case . Let us note that the entanglement monotone approach initiated here was then used in full extent in [13] and [14] . It is shown there that in fact any bipartite monotone , which is continuous and normalized on private states (i.e., ), is an upper bound on a distillable key. In particular, it is shown that the squashed entanglement [15] , [54] is also an upper bound on a distillable key.
XII. A CANDIDATE FOR NPT BOUND ENTANGLEMENT
Thus far, all known bound entangled states have positive partial transpose (are PPT). A long-standing and interesting open question is whether there exist bound entangled states, which are also NPT. If such states existed, it would imply that the quantum channel capacity is nonadditive. Since any NPT state is distillable with the aid of some PPT state [58] , we would have the curious property that one can have two states that are each nondistillable, but if one has both states, then the joint state would be distillable.
We now present a candidate for NPT bound entangled states that are based on the states of (134) and that intuitively appear to be bound entangled. To this end, first consider the following state:
(176) Globally, the flags are distinguishable, but under LOCC, the flags appear almost identical, thus after Alice and Bob's attempt to distinguish the flags, the state on will be very close to an equal mixture of and . The equal mixture of only two different EPR states is separable in dimension , but it is at the edge of separability. A slight biasing of the mixture causes the state to be entangled. Thus, if Alice and Bob are able to obtain even a small amount of information about which flags they share, they can get a distillable state on systems . More explicitly, if Alice and Bob attempt distillation by first guessing which hiding state flag they have, and then grouping the remaining parts of the states into two sets depending on their guess of the hiding state, they will be left with states of the form However what if we mix in more than two different EPR states? Namely, instead of only considering hiding states (flags) correlated to odd parity Bell states (antikey states) , we also mix in flags correlated to the even parity Bell states (key-type states)
. Consider (178) where (179) Let us take, for example, all . Then, after attempting to distinguish the hiding states, Alice and Bob will have a state that is very close to the maximally mixed state (i.e., the state will be very close to a mixture of all four Bell states). The maximally mixed state is very far from being entangled, thus even if Alice and Bob's measurements on the hiding states are able to bias the mixture away from the maximally mixed state, the state will still be separable.
Intuitively, it is thus clear why the state of (178) will not be distillable. Any protocol that attempts to first distinguish which Bell state the parties have will fail. But is the state entangled? Indeed, it is; in fact it has a negative partial transpose. To see this, we look at the block-matrix form of the shown in (180) at the bottom of the page. If the matrix were PPT, we would have, in particular (181)
We will argue that it is not true. Let us recall that (182) where we use the notation from Section XI. To see that (181) is not satisfied, we consider the following projector: (183) i.e., is a projector onto support of a positive operator . Since , we have
Moreover, we have
The above quantity is strictly greater than zero for . Thus, inequality (181) is violated on a projector . Now, it may be that there is a protocol that succeeds in distilling from the state (178), which does not rely on first performing a measurement to distinguish the hiding states. However, even taking many copies of the state produces a state of the form (186) with being the binary strings encoded in hiding states and being the basis of maximally entangled states. Thus, the form of the state is invariant under tensoring. There is thus a very strong intuition that these states are NPT bound entangled, and a very good understanding of why they might be so. Effectively, the partial transpose does not feel very strongly about the fact that the states are hiding states, but feels more strongly about the fact that they are globally orthogonal.
XIII. CONTROLLED PRIVATE QUANTUM CHANNELS
Here we demonstrate a cryptographic application of bound entangled states which have a key. A PQC [10] , [45] allows for the sending of quantum states such that an eavesdropper learns nothing about the sent states. Here we consider the cryptographic primitive of having the ability to securely send quantum states (a PQC), but that this ability can be turned on and off by a controller. Namely, we consider a three-party scenario (Alice, Bob, and the (C)controller) and demand the following.
• Alice and Bob have a private quantum channel, which they can use to send an unknown qubit from one to another in such a way that they can be sure that no eavesdropper (including the controller) can gain information about the state being sent.
• The controller has the ability to determine whether Alice and Bob can send the qubit. We now show that this can be done using shared quantum states in such a way that the controller only needs to send classical communication to one of the parties in order to activate the channel. First, let us note that the standard way of controlling the entanglement of two parties is via the Greenberger-Horne-Zeilinger (GHZ) state (187) If the controller (Claire) measures in the basis , then depending on the outcome, Alice and Bob will share either the Bell state or . If then tells them the result, they will have one unit of entanglement (ebit), which they can then use to teleport the quantum states. However, if the controller wants to give them the ability to send a single qubit securely, then the GHZ state cannot be used for this, because the controller can trick Alice and Bob into sending part of the quantum state to her. She can claim that she obtained the measurement outcome , when in reality she has not performed a measurement at all. Then, when Alice attempts to teleport a qubit to Bob, she is in fact teleporting to both Bob and the controller. The controller can then perform a measurement on her qubit to obtain partial information about the sent qubit. Note that here we are concerned with the ability to give single shot access to a quantum channel. If the controller gives Alice and Bob many ebits by performing the measurements on many copies of a GHZ state, then Alice and Bob could always perform purity testing to determine that the controller is honest.
Let us now show that unlike the GHZ, the states of (134) can be used in such a way that the controller can give Alice and Bob single shot access to a private quantum channel, in such a way that Alice and Bob are sure that the controller cannot obtain any information about the sent states even when the controller cheats. We will then show that we can do the same thing with (180) fully bound entangled states, so that Alice and Bob possess no distillable entanglement unless the controller gives it to them. First, we assume the shared state as a trusted resource, i.e., a trusted party gives Alice, Bob, and the controller some state that they use to implement the primitive. This assumption can be removed in the limit of many copies, since if Alice and Bob have many copies of the state, they can perform tomography to ensure that they indeed possess the correct state. The state we initially use is the purification of (134) (188) Namely (189) such that . Thus, and since the are orthogonal, the controller's states will be orthogonal. The controller can thus give Alice and Bob one ebit by performing a measurement to distinguish the . She then tells Alice and Bob the result. Alice and Bob on the other hand are a guaranteed security by the fact that they either possess the state or . For example, it is an incoherent mixture of the two states, and they either have one of the states or the other; they just do not know which one they have.
The state of (134), however, does have an arbitrarily small amount of distillable entanglement. Thus, Alice and Bob will have access to a private quantum channel in the case of having many copies of the state. If we want to give full control to Claire, we need to ensure that the state held by Alice and Bob in the absence of Claire's communication is nondistillable. This can be achieved by using the bound entangled states of (139), which approximate a pbit. It is not hard to verify by explicitly writing the state in the Bell basis on that the state is arbitrarily close to a state of the same form as (189), and thus has the desired properties.
XIV. CONCLUSION
We have seen that one can recast obtaining a private key under LOPC in terms of distilling private states under LOCC. One finds a general class of states that are unconditionally secure. This class includes bound entangled states from which one cannot distill pure entanglement. This then enables one to use tools developed in entanglement theory to tackle privacy theory. For example, the regularized relative entropy of entanglement was found to be an upper bound on the rate of a private key.
Many open questions remain. [39] .
The question of reversibility of creating states from private states touches another "qualitative" problem, namely, how tight is the upper bound on a distillable key, which is the regularized relative entropy of entanglement.
Exploring the wide class of private states especially in the context of the well-established theory of a distillation of entanglement appears to be a necessary step in order to solve the above important problems.
APPENDIX
A. Derivation of Formula (96) of Section VI
We show that a bipartite state of four subsystems given as (190) where are block matrices can be written as
To see this, we first write down its total purification
The states can be written as
Here is unitary transformation acting on Eve's system, is unitary transformation acting on shield , and is some fixed embedding of into (this is needed if Eve's systems are greater than the system )
where , is a fixed basis in system , while , is a fixed basis in system . We will also need a dual operation, which is a fixed projection of space into which we aimed to show.
B. The Proof of Lemma 5 in Section X-A
We prove now that the states from a family that we have introduced in (136) are indeed PPT for certain range of parameters, as it is stated in Lemma 5.
Proof: The matrix of the state (136) after partial transposition has a form of To solve this inequality, it is useful to represent the term on the left-hand side as a sum (206) where operator is an unnormalized state, which consists of all terms coming out of -fold tensor product of apart from the first term . It is good to note that has support on subspace orthogonal to . This fact allows to omit the modulus and to get This however is fulfilled for any if is taken properly large for some fixed . Indeed, the th root of (which converges to with ) can be greater than (which converges to with ) for some large .
C. Comparison of Two Criteria for Secure Key
In this section, we will compare the joint cryptographic criterion, i.e., the requirement of (112) (211) which includes both uniformity and security in one formula with the double condition where uniformity and security are treated separately, namely
The connection between these two criteria for quantum cryptographical security of the state is given in the theorem below. 
Remark 5:
The main difficulty in the proof of the above theorem is to get the term ( is size of system) rather than . The latter one would be obtained directly from Fannes-type continuities. However, to get , we have to apply tricks based on twisting. It is quite convenient not to have Eve's dimension in equivalence formula. This is because Eve's dimension depends on the protocol that leads to the key (more specifically, it depends on the amount of communication). In contrast, the dimension of Alice and Bob system is only the number of bits of an obtained key. Thus, our equivalence is independent of the protocol.
Proof: For the first part of Ttheorem 10 we assume that , which by Proposition 7 in part D of the Appendix means that we have The proof of the second part of Theorem 10 is a bit more involved. Of course, it is immediate that due to monotonicity of trace norm under partial trace, from , it follows that . The nonobvious task is to bound also . So, we assume that (220) By equality of norm and fidelity condition (13) , there holds (221) By the definition of fidelity, there are pure states and (purifications of and , respectively), such that . Without loss of generality, we can consider the system that purifies both states to be bipartite. We will call it . Now let us perform twisting operation on the parts of the pure states and , which in the case of state transforms subsystem into maximally entangled state-(we can choose such twisting because by Theorem 2 purification of an ideal state is some pdit state). For example, after such twisting, pdit will become a basic pdit (9) , which is a product with subsystem. Since unitary transformation and tracing out can only increase fidelity, then applying again (13) (229) which is a desired security condition-bound on the Holevo function of the ensemble .
D. Useful Inequalities Relating Security Conditions
In this section, we collect the relations between different security conditions for ccq states. Some of these relations have been studied in [3] . Since we will not deal with uniformity, but solely with security, it is convenient to use single index in place of . We thus consider ccq state (which could be actually called cq state) ( 
230)
Based on this fact, we can state another lemma establishing some equivalences. 
2)
3)
Here .
Proof: The first thesis follows from the mentioned equivalence of norm and fidelity and the definition of fidelity. Namely, one can make use of Lemma 1, so that if (231) holds, the fidelity is no less than . However, it is equal to average fidelity . Indeed which is just average fidelity from (232).
The second thesis of this lemma [see (232)] is again a consequence of (13) . If applied to each pair , , and averaged over probabilities of , it gives that (238) which is equivalent to 
Since , one has that for , the above inequality is also valid, which completes the proof of the second thesis of Lemma 8.
The last implication [see (233)] is a consequence of triangle inequality, which completes the lemma.
Let us notice that this lemma establishes a kind of equivalence of security conditions, namely (243) We can show now the links between the above conditions on ccq state and Holevo function of this state, i.e., of an ensemble , which we will write . Now we can make use of the inequality [46] (246) which after averaging over probabilities and by concavity of a square root gives (247) Applying now bound (245), we obtain (248) which completes the first thesis of this lemma.
To prove the second statement of the lemma, we use the Fannes inequality [see (14) Now by concavity of a binary entropy, one gets
If the entropy was increasing on interval, one could use directly the assumption that , and bound by . Since it is, however, the case only for , we have to end up with uglier, but nonetheless more useful expression. Namely, on the interval , where the entropy becomes decreasing, it is bounded by , and hence not greater than for . Thus, finally, one gets
We turn now to give the bound for . For the latter, we use the fact that the Holevo quantity is bounded from above by , which gives
To bound the last inequality, we observe that by the definition of the set , we have . Then, again by assumption (252), we have (257) Collecting inequality (255) and the above one, we arrive at the formula (258) which ends the proof of the lemma.
The lemmas above allow to prove the following proposition. where . Proof: Assuming that Holevo function is smaller than , we get by Lemma 9 that . This however implies by Lemma 8 that is also not greater than , which completes the proof of the proposition.
E. Properties of Pbits
We will give here detailed proof of Lemma 3 from Section IV-A.
Proof: Log-negativity [57] (cf., [60] ) is defined as . It is easy to see that after partial transposition on subsystem, the pbit in -form changes into The last equality comes from the fact that preserves trace. To evaluate norm of , we note that due to unitary invariance of a trace norm, we have . Consequently
The last equality follows form the fact that commutes with Hermitian conjugation, and trace norm is invariant under Hermitian conjugation . Thus, we get (265) which proves the lemma.
F. Relative Entropy of Entanglement and Pdits
We give now the proof of Theorem 4. The left-hand side of this inequality approaches with . What has to be shown is that (268) with denoting the conditional states on a subsystem. Let us first observe that for any and , which are of the same type, i.e., which have the same numbers of occurrence of symbols from the set . This is because and differ by local reversible transformation, which does not change the entanglement. Moreover, as we will see, one can consider only those for which is -strongly typical, i.e., such that for some fixed , there holds [16] (269) where denotes the frequency of a symbol in sequence . We will denote the set of such of length as . It is known that the strongly typical set carries almost whole probability mass for large , that is, for any and any , there exists such that for all
Now, since we deal here with homogeneous distribution, we can say that the probability of the set of events is directly related to the power of this set. Namely, we have
which gives . We can rewrite now the term of the left-hand side of (268) as follows: (272) We can get rid of the second term of the right-hand side of the above equality, because we can bound from above for each the term by , which gives
Now for each , we have (274) with with in place of in (269). By subadditivity of , one has (275)
Note that stands here for the state on shield part of one copy of . Applying this inequality for each in and taking maximum of the left-hand side of the above inequality over , we have a bound (276) where are the coefficients of the decomposition of some into , which yields the maximal value of over all strongly typical . Now we can rewrite the right-hand side of the above inequality as (277) where the last inequality holds for sufficiently high by assumption of strong typicality. Thus, for every and and sufficiently large , there holds (278) One then sees that the right-hand side approaches (279) in limit of large . Indeed, since for every the limit exists, the subsequence approaches this limit. Taking now infimum over and , we prove the inequality (268). This proves Theorem 4.
G. Approximate Pbits
We give here the proof of Lemma 4.
Proof: Assume first that . Since the elements are real, by hermicity of the state, we have (280) This is, however, less than or equal to , which is in turn greater than , and the assertion follows. For the second part of the lemma, assume that . We then have
We now bound the sum of and . By positivity of the state, we have that . Now, by arithmetic-geometric mean inequality, we have that , which gives the proof.
H. Relative Entropy Bound
Proof of Lemma 7 in Section XI: Let us first show that (281) for any . We first show this for "derived" from some pure product states (282) Because is a product, it can be written as (283) with normalized and on a subsystem , respectively. Now the condition that the reduced state has overlap with no greater than is
where are arbitrary vectors of norm one arising from the action of on and . Since the are arbitrary, they can incorporate the phases of , so that we require now , where and are probabilities. Now, the right-hand side will not decrease if we assume so we require , which is satisfied by any probability distribution, which gives the proof of (281) for special . To show the inequality is true in general, we find that (288) which is a desired bound.
